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A strong view has emerged this past year from many farm groups that crop insurance should play a pivotal role in 
the 2012 Farm Bill and beyond. Meanwhile, some have questioned the near-consensus support for crop insurance. 
This article addresses why crop insurance has taken on a primary position among farm support programs and 
examines alternative paths that crop insurance could take in the future, including some ways it could assume an even 
larger role. 
 
The Ascendency of Crop Insurance 
The use of crop insurance by U.S. farmers has grown sharply, increasing from 45 million insured acres in 1981 to 262 
million in 2011 (Figure 1). Insured liability shows a sharper increase, rising from $6 billion in 1981 to more than $113 
billion in 2011. More acreage, higher crop prices, and increased coverage levels explain the dramatic rise in liability. 
Several factors explain greater use of crop insurance by farmers.Today’s insurance program structure began with the 
Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980, which required crop insurance to be sold and serviced by the private sector. 
With private sector compensation based on the volume of premium sold, companies and agents had a strong 
incentive to bring crop insurance to producers. Increases in premium subsidies and government payment of 
insurance company delivery costs made crop insurance increasingly affordable over time, boosting participation and 
coverage levels.  
Figure 2 illustrates the share of premium subsidized by the Federal government for an individual policy at the 75% 
coverage level. The 1980 Act set the premium subsidy at 16.9% for a policy with 75% coverage. Despite the subsidy, 
demand remained limited by reliance on other programs such as ad hoc disaster assistance, target price coverage, 
and commodity loan programs. The subsidy rate was increased slightly by the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1994. 
Temporary economic loss assistance in the late 1990s provided a premium discount, which continued until a 
permanent increase was provided in the Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2002 (ARPA). ARPA raised subsidies, 
particularly at the higher coverage levels, with the 75% coverage level subsidy more than doubling. The 2008 Farm 
Bill did not change subsidy rates for individual insurance plans but increased subsidy rates for enterprise and whole 
farm units to 77% for a policy with 75% coverage on an enterprise unit. 
 
Other factors also contributed to higher demand for coverage. The Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 
required producers to have crop insurance to be eligible for farm program benefits. While short lived, this requirement 
introduced many producers to crop insurance. Reductions in the level of protection provided by farm programs and 
requirements to have crop insurance in order to be eligible for the receipt of ad hoc disaster payments encouraged 
participation and higher coverage levels. Greater volatility in commodity markets (Figure 3) and efforts to acquaint 
producers with risk management strategies may have also increased insurance demand. Program improvements 
have attracted additional producer participation. These improvements, introduced during the late 1990’s, included 
more appropriate premium rates for some crops; reduction of waste, fraud, and abuse; and new and better plans of 
insurance, such as revenue plans. 
Current Program Characteristics Farm programs have evolved from very market intervening programs to those that let market forces operate more 
fully, with producers shouldering greater responsibility to manage risks. In line with this evolution, the crop insurance 
program has a number of appealing features (NCIS, 2011). A producer must consciously elect to manage risks, can 
design a program to fit individual farm risks, and must share in the program cost, reducing public costs and aiding 
accountability. 
The private sector delivers the crop insurance program as part of a public and private partnership, providing producer 
choice, and promoting competition in service quality and efficiency and effectiveness in delivery. Through the private 
sector, producer losses are adjusted and indemnities paid promptly. Congress has enabled the program to largely 
govern itself—with the USDA responsible for setting premium rates, underwriting and loss adjustment standards, and 
enforcing compliance. Thus many program provisions can be quickly changed to correct program parameters and 
reduce costs and inefficiencies. Premium rate changes and a reduction in payments to companies negotiated in the 
2011 Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) are examples of such discretionary actions. Little found that the 
program operates with fraud and abuse levels far below other lines of property and casualty insurance (Review of the 
Integrity and Efficacy of the Federal Crop Insurance Program, 2007). Crop insurance also allows many producers to 
secure credit, as an insurance policy serves as collateral, and aids forward marketing by providing resources to meet 
delivery obligations in the event of a production loss. 
While the aforementioned factors help explain the program’s attraction, there are concerns. U.S. loss ratios —
indemnities divided by premiums—have been well below the statutory maximum of 1.0 for many years and vary 
sharply among regions, raising questions about whether the rating system suitably accounts for program 
improvements over time, changing production technology, and the probabilities of catastrophes. A premium rate 
review was conducted by the Risk Management Agency (RMA) in 2010 and a major revision in rating methods is now 
being implemented. Recently, low losses and high crop prices have resulted in higher-than-expected company 
underwriting gains and delivery payments. Although some argue they remain excessive, the 2011 SRA and the 
recent rating changes have reduced the expected value of private insurance company underwriting gains and 
delivery payments, and the long-term average net income of crop insurance companies remains below that in the 
overall property and casualty industry (Grant Thornton, LLP, 2011). Many producers are concerned that crop 
insurance yields lag expected yields or reduce coverage after successive years of yield shortfalls, as required by 
most crop insurance plans. An adjustment to reflect yield trends, recently approved for sale for 2012, may partly 
address this issue. Another concern is whether the portfolio of insurance plans can be improved for small producers, 
socially disadvantaged producers, specialty crops and other crops that may not be covered or have atypical or 
specific risks or lack transparent pricing. 
Possible Future Roles for Crop Insurance 
While there now appears to be much agreement that crop insurance will continue to be the primary program in the 
future farm safety net, there are alternative views on how to address program concerns and how crop insurance 
should evolve, including the extent to which it should be integrated with existing or new farm programs. These 
approaches are summarized next. 
I—Reduce or Eliminate Subsidies. Reflecting higher participation, coverage levels, and commodity prices, the 
expected public cost of the program is now about $8 billion per year, raising criticism of underwriting gains, delivery 
costs, and premium subsidies—the components of program costs (Babcock, 2011; Smith, 2011). While the 2011 
SRA and recent premium rate reductions at least partly address the first two cost components, premium subsidy 
rates are set in statute. One option to cut costs is to retain the current program structure but reduce premium 
subsidies. Premium subsidies are a fixed percentage of premiums which makes the dollar value of subsidies higher 
for higher risk producers of a particular crop, other things equal. High subsidy levels may encourage the purchase of 
insurance for the purpose of earning a return, rather than just protecting against a risky outcome. Record-high farm 
income and the need to cut Federal spending motivate suggestions to cut or end subsidies. 
One suggestion, around for a while, has been to distribute limited premium subsidies through vouchers (for example, 
Glauber, 2004). Another idea would simply cap subsidies per farm (Smith, 2011) or impose eligibility criteria on 
subsidies. Another approach is to reduce subsidies for certain plans of insurance, such as charging premium rates for 
Catastrophic Coverage (CAT) rather than the current administrative fee or eliminating subsidies for the price 
component of revenue policies (Babcock, 2011). Other ideas include further reducing payments to companies. 
Proponents of lower subsidies argue such changes would help meet World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations, 
reduce the deficit, improve market orientation, and better reflect farm household well-being relative to nonfarm 
households. 
The downside of reducing or ending crop insurance subsidies would be a likely reduction in participation and 
coverage levels, depending on the type of changes made to the program. Lower coverage levels would expose 
producers to more price, yield, and quality risk and could encourage the government to provide ad hoc payments in 
the event of a widespread declared disaster. Sharp cuts in premium subsidies, delivery cost payments to companies, and Federal reinsurance would likely generate significant opposition from producers, companies, and farm suppliers. 
For example, loss of subsidies for price protection in revenue insurance would likely limit producers’ ability to forward 
market, adding to risk exposure. In the extreme, with full privatization of the program, including loss of Federal 
reinsurance, premium rates would rise sharply and would have to include a delivery cost load, leading to much 
smaller sales and a contraction in delivery infrastructure with fewer companies and agents. Companies would no 
longer be required to sell to all farmers who want a policy, and in some cases, coverage may not even be offered to 
some producers and some areas. A possible response to avoid such outcomes could be a push for a Federal 
program, such as described in the next two sections. However, creating a free Federal program to substitute for crop 
insurance is simply a continuation of subsidies, but in a different form. 
II—Wrap individual crop insurance around index plans of insurance. One idea is to provide a base level of coverage 
to program crop producers in the form of a free Federal area or another type of index plan of protection, with privately 
delivered insurance purchased by producers to cover added individual risks (Coble and Barnett, 2008; Babcock, 
2010; Smith, 2011; Zulauf, 2011a). This wrapped, privately delivered insurance may be subsidized or not. The idea is 
that an index plan, based on area yields, revenues, vegetation conditions, or weather variables, would have low 
administrative costs and limited moral hazard—actions by the producer that increase the likelihood and severity of a 
loss. Such index plans are not currently integrated with individual plans, but could be integrated. For example, a 
Federal area revenue program that covers all area losses in excess of 15% could be provided free to cover more 
widespread correlated risks, with private insurance companies being left on their own to sell policies to cover other 
farm risks. Another approach would be to use payments made under a Federal index plan to offset indemnities paid 
under the current individual crop insurance policies, thus reducing crop insurance net indemnities. This concept was 
most recently proposed by the American Farm Bureau Federation (2011). Such options reduce program duplication, 
crop insurance program costs, and premium rates. Also, an index plan requiring a 30% loss to trigger a payment 
could potentially be exempt from penalties under the WTO. 
The downside of wrapped approaches is that index plans work better the more highly related the producer’s loss is 
with the index’s loss. This means to be effective the index insurance would have to apply on a more local scale like 
the county or another small geographic area, which increases program cost and complexity. 
Individual insurance does a better job of protecting against risk than index plans and is preferred by most producers 
(Bulut, Collins, and Zacharias, 2011). Index plans are unlikely to be effective for producers in regions that are very 
heterogeneous in terms of topography, climate, soil type, etc. Another issue is that, depending on the structure of the 
product, the index plan may just substitute for production or revenue currently covered by crop insurance, adding little 
to the overall risk reduction of the farm, although lower premium rates may encourage participation and higher 
coverage levels on individual policies. Greater reliance on crop insurance wrapped around index products that 
substitute for some of the risk protection now provided by crop insurance would likely require a rerating and a new 
SRA. Crop insurance companies would likely bear less risk and provide less risk protection, as Federal assumption of 
risk increased, with the likely effect of a smaller private crop insurance industry over time. 
III—Expand farm programs to cover uninsured production and possibly enhance income. Some proposals maintain 
crop insurance as is, but supplement its coverage with free farm programs to reduce uninsured losses which occur 
due to the policy’s deductible and farm insurance yields being below expected yields. The Average Crop Revenue 
Election (ACRE) and the Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments (SURE) programs are examples. The now-
expired SURE program raised coverage levels of the underlying policies on an individual whole-farm basis and 
subtracted indemnities from SURE payments. The ACRE program tries to effectively raise a producer’s coverage 
levels using an area revenue guarantee of 90% of expected state revenue. Indemnities are not subtracted from the 
ACRE payment, but a maximum ACRE payment rate of 25% of the state revenue guarantee reduces the overlap with 
crop insurance indemnities (Zulauf, Schnitkey and Langemeier, 2010). 
A range of farm revenue programs that would supplement crop insurance proposals have been discussed for the 
2012 Farm Bill (for example, Zulauf, 2011b). They would essentially replace ACRE and include area plans with 
guarantees as high as 95% of revenue but with a maximum payment rate as low as 10% of the guarantee to better 
target the deductible on most insurance policies and limit overlap with crop insurance. There are also plans based on 
individual farm losses. Overall risk protection would be increased as the plans supplement crop insurance. Multiyear 
protection and enhanced farm income are provided when the price component of the guarantee is set to exceed 
expected prices in low price years. 
These supplemental plans have several disadvantages. Guarantees set at high levels to supplement crop insurance 
rather than replace it may generate WTO issues, encourage more risk taking and production, and thus impede 
production response in excess supply periods. This may be especially true for individual farm plans, which also have 
moral hazard. The area plans suffer from basis risk, or imperfect correlation between farm and area yields, potentially 
paying when a farm has little to no loss and not paying when a farm has a loss. Also, the more the supplemental 
coverage band overlaps higher levels of crop insurance coverage, the more the supplemental plan will reduce crop 
insurance demand at the higher coverage levels. IV—Expand crop insurance to cover uninsured production and possibly enhance income. Another approach is to 
have no supplementary free farm programs and rely on the delivery assets and benefits of the crop insurance 
program. Unlike the supplemental farm program plans, crop insurance covers far more crops. As the sole program, 
there may be interest in expanding crop insurance features to address currently uninsured production for all crops, 
with coverage enhancements subsidized at alternative levels. Subsidies on existing underlying policies could be 
retained or reduced as budget and policy objectives require. A number of the following options could be used. 
1.  Expand maximum coverage levels under the policy. The maximum insurance coverage available is 85% of 
expected production or revenue on most individual polices. One idea is to provide crop insurance 
participants with a free five-percentage-point increase in coverage (Barnaby, 2011). While this would reduce 
uninsured coverage, it has cost implications for the government as suggested by premium rates which 
reflect expected costs and rise sharply at high coverage levels. The free coverage increase may also cause 
producers to buy less coverage on the underlying policy. This option would also add to administrative costs, 
as there would be more frequent loss adjustment.  Moral hazard would also likely increase. 
2.   Expand maximum coverage levels and implement coinsurance payments. One way to reduce the cost and 
moral hazard of higher coverage levels is to raise maximum coverage levels but implement coinsurance. For 
example, a producer could buy an 85% policy that provides a 90% coverage level. Losses in excess of 15% 
would be paid in full, while losses in the 10% to 15% range would be paid in part, with part of the loss in that 
layer borne by the producer. Further, the producer could be permitted to select the range of coverage over 
which coinsurance would apply, for example 65% to 85%. 
3.  Permit a producer to buy an area plan to cover the deductible portion of the individual policy. This option 
was proposed for the 2008 Farm Bill by the Administration and Rep. Neugebauer and recently for the 2012 
Farm Bill (National Cotton Council, 2011). This idea is similar to using a supplemental farm program area 
plan to cover uninsured production, as described earlier, so it has the same issues, such as basis risk, 
except now the plan would be sold by insurance companies. A producer with an individual crop insurance 
policy could buy two policies on the same acre. The current policy would cover individual risk and the area 
policy would partly cover the deductible. The area plan could be similar to area plans now being sold, or 
tailored to the producer’s selected deductible. 
4.  Provide disappearing deductible coverage. Under this idea, the producer’s indemnity would be multiplied by 
1.0 divided by the coverage level. For example, the payment under a policy with 75% coverage would equal 
the indemnity paid on the individual policy multiplied by 1.333 (1.0/0.75). The added payment would cover 
only a small portion of the deductible for small losses but would completely eliminate the deductible at 100% 
loss. This option would be easy to administer and rate, require no new loss adjustment, but would not cover 
small losses and could encourage some moral hazard. 
5.  Provide a supplemental disaster payment through the crop insurance program.Under this idea, any producer 
in a disaster county who has crop insurance would receive a payment equal to a fixed percentage of any 
indemnity paid such that the payment and the indemnity do not exceed 100% of expected revenue. For 
example, a 33.3% disaster payment rate for a producer with a 75% policy would behave exactly as a 
disappearing deductible. However, with a lower payment rate, the deductible would not be fully covered. As 
this would be a disaster program funded by the government, delivered by crop insurance companies, and 
possibly free, it could be more costly than other options. It would be easy to administer, would incentivize the 
purchase of crop insurance, but would not cover small losses or help those without insurance. 
Figure 4 illustrates how coinsurance, a supplemental crop insurance area plan, disappearing deductible, and a 
disaster payment might work to augment income with a 75% crop insurance policy. The line for the supplemental 
disaster payment assumes a 33% payment rate so it is coincident with the disappearing deductible. The area plan 
line depends on how the producer’s loss compares with the area’s loss. As drawn, the area plan covers 75% to 85% 
of the expected area revenue and is assumed to perfectly supplement the individual plan and provide protection up to 
85%—assuming the farm and area have exactly the same expected revenue and losses. In reality, that would be the 
best case and highly improbable. The other extreme would be that the area plan never triggers when the producer 
has a loss. In that case the relevant line is the 75% crop insurance policy and the area plan is ineffective, again an 
improbable case.  
What next? 
As Federal spending on traditional farm programs diminishes while that for crop insurance expands, crop insurance 
has drawn increasing scrutiny from critics of farm subsidies and those wanting agriculture to contribute to deficit 
reduction. At the same time, many want to continue or strengthen the current program for its risk management 
benefits for producers, while still retaining some Federal farm program support. These views have led to different 
proposals for future farm safety net programs fashioned around risk management objectives. From a crop insurance 
perspective, these proposals may be viewed as either reducing crop insurance subsidies, substituting a free farm 
program for part of the risk that crop insurance now covers, augmenting crop insurance with a new free farm program 
that covers losses crop insurance does not cover, and expanding crop insurance to replace farm programs. 
The 2012 Farm Bill proposal of the House and Senate Agriculture Committee chairs, submitted to the Joint 
Committee on Deficit Reduction in the fall of 2011, incorporated several of the options discussed here, including a 
supplemental revenue farm program based on individual farm losses and supplemental area revenue plans sold by 
the crop insurance industry (Stabenow, 2011). While the area plans would likely expand crop insurance coverage, the 
supplemental individual farm revenue program would likely displace some crop insurance sales at high coverage 
levels. While the fate of this proposal is unknown, it illustrates key choices that have to be made, including 
government versus private delivery, government versus private risk bearing, and the extent of deductible, or shallow 
loss, coverage. Whatever structure emerges, the debate over farm and crop insurance subsidies is likely to continue. 
With deficit reduction in prospect for years to come and insurance so fundamental to risk management in all 
economic areas, the long-term most sustainable safety net program for farmers may be enhanced crop insurance—
but likely with more restricted subsidization. 
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